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Costs of Air Quality Regulation
Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Henderson
5.1 Introduction
An ongoing debate in the United States concerns the costs environmen-
tal regulations impose on industry. In this paper, we explore some of the
costs associated with air quality regulation. In particular, we focus on regu-
lation pertaining to ground-level ozone (O3) and its eﬀects on two indus-
tries sensitive to such regulation—industrial organic chemicals (Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation [SIC] 2865–9) and miscellaneous plastic products
(SIC 308). Both of these industries are major emitters of volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOX), the chemical precursors
to ozone. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudi-
nal Research Database (LRD), we examine the eﬀects this type of regula-
tion has had on the timing and magnitudes of investments by ﬁrms in these
industries and on the impact it has had on their operating costs. As an al-
ternative way to assess costs, we also employ plant-level data from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE)
survey.
Our prior work has found a variety of eﬀects on industry behavior at-
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159tributable to environmental costs (Becker and Henderson 2000). Here we
attempt to quantify some of these costs. To identify eﬀects, we use spatial
variation in regulatory stringency as well as temporal diﬀerences arising
from the introduction of heightened regulation. Our previous research has
shown that plant age and plant size are important determinants of who
gets regulated when and how intensely, so we incorporate these elements
into our analysis here as well. Our models also control for location-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects, which is critical in this type of work. Here, we ﬁnd that regu-
lation indeed signiﬁcantly increases production costs, especially for young
plants, with estimates that (arguably) are higher than the expenditure data
from the PACE survey suggest. Our results also show that regulation may
lead plants to restrict their size, and the reasons why this might be the case
are discussed. We also ﬁnd that, in at least one of these two industries,
investment proﬁles are signiﬁcantly altered for plants subject to regulation,
with relatively more up-front investment and less phasing-in.
In section 5.2, we oﬀer a general overview of air quality regulation in
the United States, introducing our key environmental variable and dis-
cussing some of the diﬃculties involved in identifying a control and a treat-
ment group for empirical work. In section 5.3, we discuss the results from
our prior research that led us to our current focus. We then turn to a de-
scription of our data in section 5.4. The three ensuing sections present re-
sults from our analyses of the size and timing of investments, regulatory
costs using data from the LRD, and cost estimates using PACE data. The
ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks.
5.2 The Nature of Air Quality Regulation
Each year (since 1978) each county in the United States is designated as
either being in or out of attainment of the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone. Areas that are in nonattain-
ment of this standard are, by law, required to bring themselves into attain-
ment or face harsh federal sanctions. The primary way of achieving attain-
ment is through the regulation of VOC- and NOX-emitting sources within
one’s jurisdiction—particularly manufacturing plants in certain industries.
As a result, these plants in nonattainment areas face much stricter environ-
mental regulation than their counterparts in attainment areas.
For example, in nonattainment areas, plants with the potential to pollute
are subject to more stringent and more costly technological requirements
on their capital equipment. New plants wanting to locate in nonattainment
counties (as well as existing plants undertaking major expansion and/or
renewal) are subject to lowest achievable emission rates (LAER), requiring
the installation of the “cleanest” available equipment without regard to
cost. Existing plants in nonattainment counties, who are grandfathered
from these strict requirements (at least until they update their equipment),
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usually some simple retroﬁtting—which is to take into account the eco-
nomic burden it places on a ﬁrm. In contrast, in attainment counties, only
new plants and only those with the potential to emit over (originally) 100
tons per year of a criteria pollutant are subject to regulation of their capital
equipment, and the technological standard is a weaker one. Rather than
LAER, large new plants in attainment counties are required to install best
available control technology (BACT), which is negotiated on a case-by-
case basis and is to be sensitive to the economic impact on a ﬁrm. Existing
plants and small new plants in attainment areas face no speciﬁc require-
ments on their capital equipment.
In addition to more stringent technological requirements, nonattain-
ment status also usually entails higher costs in other areas as well. Forced
to “produce environmental quality,” plants in nonattainment areas must
purchase additional inputs. Additional labor is certainly required; how-
ever, “environmental production” may also call for more (and/or more
expensive) materials and energy as well. Costly redesigns of production
processes can also be involved. And any proposed expansion—either the
construction of a new plant or the modiﬁcation of an existing facility—
must ﬁrst be approved by environmental regulators. This permitting pro-
cess can involve lengthy and costly negotiations over equipment speciﬁca-
tions, emissions limits, and the like. The purchase of pollution oﬀsets may
also be required. Finally, plants in nonattainment areas face a greater like-
lihood of being inspected and ﬁned than their counterparts in attainment
areas.
As this discussion reveals, we have (at least in principle) a control and
a treatment group with which to estimate the costs of regulation. In partic-
ular, given age (i.e., new vs. existing plants), we would expect capital costs,
labor costs, operating costs, and so forth to be higher for plants in counties
classiﬁed as being in nonattainment of the NAAQS for ozone than for
plants located in counties classiﬁed as being in attainment. The reality of
the situation, however, is a bit murkier than this neat dichotomy would
suggest. First, within a county, regulatory scrutiny often varies by plant
size. In attainment areas, large new plants are required to install BACT,
while small new plants have no speciﬁc requirements. In nonattainment
areas, diﬀerential treatment is de facto rather than by decree. Local regula-
tors, who are generally resource constrained, focus their enforcement on
larger (and hence more polluting) plants, while smaller plants have been
slow to be classiﬁed as polluters, and once classiﬁed, may be inspected
infrequently or not at all. Then, given plant age and size, regulatory treat-
ment of otherwise similar polluters may diﬀer from one nonattainment
area to the next because of variation in state philosophies on how best to
achieve attainment. Even within a state, nonattainment areas may face
diﬀerent degrees of regulation because they diﬀer in the extent to which
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exist: Some face a degree of regulation above what is normally required
of them simply because they are in states with strong environmental
agendas.
In the empirical speciﬁcations that follow, we are mindful of diﬀerences
in regulatory treatment that are due to plant characteristics, such as age
and size. The remaining diﬀerences, then, between attainment and nonat-
tainment areas are “typical” diﬀerences—alert to the fact that each group
itself may have some signiﬁcant variation in regulatory intensity. We also
note two potential qualiﬁcations that aﬀect this interpretation of our re-
sults. First, there is the notion that plants in attainment areas may incur
environmental costs “voluntarily,” as opposed to being required to do so
by regulators. Such plants, for example, may be reluctant to install “dirty”
production equipment in this day and age for fear of protests and law suits,
as well as inducing active regulation. Furthermore, for plants in many in-
dustries, dirty equipment that may still be permissible for use in attain-
ment areas may no longer be available for purchase. Prior to the regulatory
era, plants in polluting industries were mostly located in (what would be-
come) nonattainment areas and a considerable proportion still remain
there. These producers spur technological innovation and create a market
for “green” production equipment, which have aﬀected equipment choices
for everyone. Therefore, plants in attainment areas may incur environmen-
tal costs that are not the result of regulation per se, but rather are the
result of various other forces (social, political, technological, etc.). Our
approach, therefore, of comparing plants in attainment and nonattainment
areas, will not reveal the full costs of regulation (from comparing a world
with regulation to one without regulation and these other forces), but
should at least reveal a lower bound on such costs.
Our second qualiﬁcation only serves to lower this lower bound even
further. In particular, plants may self-select into attainment or nonattain-
ment areas. For example, it may be the case that ﬁrms who choose to
locate in nonattainment areas may, to some extent, be those who can best
handle regulatory costs. Firms in attainment areas, on the other hand,
may be ones for whom regulation would be particularly burdensome. This
would suggest that our estimates of regulatory costs are for a select
group—understating costs for the typical plant.1 Both these qualiﬁcations
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
1. In theory, one might control for self-selection by using plant ﬁxed eﬀects in modeling
(rather than county ﬁxed eﬀects, which we use here). In practice, however, imposing plant
ﬁxed eﬀects eliminates many young plants (since these ﬁxed eﬀects require each plant to
appear in two censuses, at least 5 years apart), makes identiﬁcation of age eﬀects impossible,
and greatly reduces sample sizes. We therefore resign ourselves to any selection bias that
may be present, realizing that it will reduce our estimates of treatment eﬀects.
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In our previous work in this area (Becker and Henderson 2000), we
investigate the eﬀects ozone nonattainment (vs. attainment) status has had
on the decisions of ﬁrms in polluting industries. In that study (described
in more detail later) we focus on major VOC- (and NOX-) emitting indus-
tries that (1) have had large numbers of plants and plant births (nation-
ally), and (2) do not have (as) much other air pollution emissions. These
industries are industrial organic chemicals (SIC 2865–9), miscellaneous
plastic products (SIC 308), metal containers (SIC 3411–2), and wood
household furniture (SIC 2511). In this current paper, we focus on just the
ﬁrst two of these. Industrial organic chemicals, as in turns out, is the heavi-
est polluter of all of these industries (it actually manufactures VOCs!) and
has the largest average plant sizes. Miscellaneous plastic products uses
VOCs in its production and has the convenient property of being the in-
dustry with the largest sample size. Plant-level data for both studies come
from the 1963–92 Censuses of Manufactures.
Our current line of research expands on previous work by Henderson
(1996). Prior to this, much of the literature found little eﬀect of state or
county diﬀerences in environmental regulation on ﬁrm behavior (e.g., Bar-
tik 1988; McConnell and Schwab 1990; Gray 1997; Levinson 1996). Much
of this work, however, has been based on cross-sectional data and/or meth-
ods, which has proven to be a critical limitation. In order to properly dis-
entangle the inherent locational and productivity advantages typical of
nonattainment areas from the adverse (regulatory) impacts of nonattain-
ment status, panel data and methods are necessary, such as those used in
Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), and Kahn (1994). We,
again, employ such data and methods here in this paper.
Our earlier research (Becker and Henderson 2000) yielded three key
ﬁndings. First, plant births in these polluting industries (followed by the
stocks of plants) have, with the advent of regulation, shifted over time
from nonattainment to attainment areas, while general economic activity
has not exhibited such a shift. Depending on the industry and time period
one looks at, the expected number of new plants in these industries in
ozone nonattainment areas dropped by 25–45 percent. The sectors tar-
geted ﬁrst and most intensely by regulators were those industries with the
largest plants and, within industries, the “corporate” sector (with its larger
plants) compared to the “nonaﬃliate” (or single-plant ﬁrm) sector. This
supports the notion that size matters in who is regulated when and how
intensely.
Second, survival rates of plants in nonattainment areas, while originally
the same as those in attainment areas, rose with the advent of regulation.
Recall that existing plants are grandfathered from the strictest regulations
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RACT requirements. New plants, on the other hand, are subject to costly
LAER requirements. Existing plants, therefore, have a cost advantage over
new entrants and reason to stay in business longer than they might have
otherwise. Similarly, as regulations tighten over time, former new plants
(with former LAER equipment) are exempt from the tightening. The net
eﬀect is better survival of existing plants in nonattainment areas and incen-
tive to delay equipment renewal and changes in product composition.
There is yet another explanation for this result. Older ﬁrms may get heavily
involved in their states’ regulatory process—working with regulators to
formulate regulations, advocating for particular laws, and so forth. Even if
the regulatory process remains without favoritism, these ﬁrms have insid-
ers’ knowledge of what their state regulators are most focused on. It may,
therefore, be easier and less costly for them to meet the speciﬁcations and
regulations issued by that particular state.
Third, it appears that plants in nonattainment areas, rather than phas-
ing in investment over a 5- to 10-year period, do more up-front with less
subsequent investment. In terms of sales and employment, we found that
new plants in nonattainment areas started oﬀ anywhere from 25 to 70
percent larger, but after 10 years, no size diﬀerences remained. The permit-
ting process for the construction of a new plant in a nonattainment area (as
well as the proposed expansion of existing facilities) can require months of
costly negotiations—involving the ﬁrm, its environmental consultants,
state regulators, and the regional Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)—over equipment speciﬁcations, emissions limits, the purchase of
pollution oﬀsets, and the like. By investing all at once, these plants avoid
incurring negotiation costs over and over again; moreover, they preserve
their grandfathered status.
Our current paper expands on these ﬁndings in two ways. First, we re-
visit the issue of regulation’s impact on the size and timing of plants’ in-
vestments (the third key ﬁnding) by examining data on plants’ capital
stock formation, instead of using sales and employment data as we did
before. The questions we ask here (and the methodology we employ) are
similar to those in our previous paper. Namely, does nonattainment induce
more up-front investment and less subsequent investment as a result of
the costly negotiating and permitting process required for plant expansion
under regulation? And, given that regulatory scrutiny seems to be closely
related to plant size, is downsizing evident in nonattainment areas relative
to attainment areas once the initial investment period of a new plant is
past? Also, how does regulation impact the capital-to-labor use of plants
in these industries?
The second (and major) focus of this paper is in actually quantifying
regulatory costs. The birth model estimated in Becker and Henderson
(2000) implies that the number of new plants in nonattainment areas drops
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the birth process is that, in any given year, there is a local supply of poten-
tial entrepreneurs to an industry in a county and a (demand) schedule of
proﬁt opportunities decreasing in the number of births. Nonattainment
status shifts back the (demand) schedule of proﬁt opportunities, moving
the county down the supply curve and reducing births. The implied per-
centage drop in plant proﬁts (which are unobserved) is unclear since both
demand and supply elasticities are involved in a reduced-form speciﬁca-
tion of birth counts.2
In this paper, we look at this issue from the cost side. In particular, we
ask what happens to a plant’s operating costs if we move it from an attain-
ment to a nonattainment area. We perform this experiment by comparing
the production costs of plants in nonattainment counties (our treatment
group) with those in attainment counties and those in existence before the
advent of regulation (our control group). Since our prior work suggests
that both plant size and plant age matter in regulation, we incorporate
these factors into our analysis as well. And, as we mentioned earlier, this
t y p eo fw o r ks u ﬀers tremendously if inherent county characteristics are
not controlled for, so we also employ county ﬁxed eﬀects in all our models.
Given these ﬁxed eﬀects, the nonattainment eﬀe c ti si d e n t i ﬁ e db yd i ﬀer-
ences between attainment and nonattainment counties arising from the
imposition of regulation (in 1978), relative to any diﬀerences that might
have existed in the preregulatory period (when there were no regulatory
diﬀerences between these counties). Recall from our comments in section
5.2 that estimated cost diﬀerences between attainment and nonattainment
areas are likely to represent a lower bound on true regulatory costs. We
will see in the next section that there are additional reasons why we cannot
estimate the full costs of regulation.
5.4 The Data
Our plant-level data come from the LRD, available through the Census
Bureau’s Center for Economic Studies. Here, we use only the quinquennial
Census of Manufactures from the period 1972–92. And since we require
(nonimputed) data on capital assets for both our examination of invest-
ment patterns and our estimation of cost functions, we use mainly those
plants that are also in the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) in
those years.3 We further eliminate any plants that are administrative record
2. Note that, even with regulation, nonattainment counties do have some births, given a
local supply of entrepreneurs (with their own idiosyncracies) and local and regional de-
mand forces.
3. Total assets (buildings and machinery together) was also asked of non-ASM plants in
the 1987 and 1992 censuses. For our cost function exercises, since we are not interested in
the separate components of capital stock, we also use these plants in our estimation.
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(i.e., have a zero value for any critical variable). We further restrict our
attention to “corporate” (or “multiunit”) plants. Controlling for age, these
plants are much larger than single-plant ﬁrms and are therefore more likely
to be regulated and exhibit regulatory eﬀects. Their data may also be more
accurate than those for single-plant ﬁrms, and they certainly account for
most of an industry’s output.4 Finally, the inclusion of county ﬁxed eﬀects
in our models requires plants to be in counties where at least one other
plant-year is observed. The impact of this restriction on sample sizes is
relatively slight; less than 5 percent of plants are lost as a result of this re-
quirement. In the end, our samples contain 70–74 percent of all multiunit
plants in industrial organic chemicals and 53–61 percent of all such plants
in miscellaneous plastics.
In our investment regressions (in section 5.5) we use a plant’s stock of
real capital and its real capital-to-labor ratio as dependent variables. For
these regressions we use, as our measure of real capital stock, end-of-year
machinery and equipment assets (which are on an “original cost” basis)
divided by capital-asset deﬂators constructed from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) published data (see Becker 1998). Plant total employment
serves as the denominator of our ratio. Here, and in our cost function
regressions, plant age dummies are (generally) determined by the time
elapsed since the plant’s ﬁrst appearance in the Census of Manufactures,
regardless of its industry in that ﬁrst appearance. In our empirical speciﬁ-
cations below, we recognize three age categories: 0–4 years, 5–9 years, and
10 years.5
For our cost-function regressions, a plant’s total costs are deﬁned as the
sum of its salaries and wages; its costs of materials, fuels, electricity, and
contract work; and the cost of “capital services.” The last is calculated by
multiplying beginning-of-year total assets (machinery, equipment, struc-
tures, and buildings) by an appropriate “user cost factor.”6 Note that these
data from the Census of Manufactures do not subsume all of the (pre-
viously noted) costs associated with environmental regulation (e.g., ﬁnes,
4. In industrial organic chemicals, corporate plants account for about 97 percent of the
industry’s output. In miscellaneous plastic products, they account for about 72 percent.
5. For example, a plant in the 1972 census is 0–4 years of age if it is making its ﬁrst census
appearance in 1972. It is 5–9 years of age if it made its ﬁrst census appearance in 1967 and
10 years of age if it made its ﬁrst census appearance in the 1963 census. The recognition
of any additional age categories is not practical. Since the LRD does not contain any of the
censuses prior to 1963, we are not able to distinguish between 1972 plants that are 10–14
and 15 years of age. Excluding 1972 plants from the analyses (and using just 1977–92
plants) avoids this problem but unfortunately eliminates an important (control) group of
preregulatory plants that help us identify the eﬀects of regulation. On the opposite end, fewer
age categories would not buy us any additional data. In principle, two age categories would
allow us to use plants in the 1967 census as well; however, capital-asset data were not col-
lected from these plants and therefore they are of no use to us for the types of analyses we
wish to conduct here. Using three age categories, therefore, is ideal.
6. The diﬃculty here is that the asset information collected by the Census Bureau is on an
original cost basis. It reﬂects the book value of assets (of various vintages and quality, etc.),
166 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Hendersonpollution oﬀsets, and environmental consultants), which obviously aﬀects
plants in nonattainment areas more than those in attainment areas. This
is yet another reason to view any estimated cost diﬀe r e n c e sa sal o w e r
bound on the true cost of regulation. What will be captured here is regula-
tion’s impact on the use of labor, capital, and some of the other inputs, as
well as any impact it may have on production (output). Here, total output
of a plant in a given year is measured by its total value of shipments in that
year, with appropriate adjustments for changes to inventory. This value
of output is then divided by the industry’s (national) output price index
to yield a real measure of plant output. This price index, along with the
industry-speciﬁc materials price index (referred to later), is taken from the
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman, Becker, and
Gray 1998).
In addition to these plant-level data, we also have information on county
characteristics. In particular, we have LRD-derived, county-level measures
of average manufacturing wages and total manufacturing employment, ex-
clusive of the industry being analyzed. We also have county ozone nonat-
tainment status, as recorded annually in the Code of Federal Regulations
(Title 40, Part 81, Subsection C). Given that 1978 was the ﬁrst year in
which counties were designated as being in or out of attainment, the plants
in the 1982 Census of Manufactures would have been the ﬁrst ones to
directly feel the eﬀects of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. And
since the previous year’s attainment status determines the current year’s
regulation, we use 1981 nonattainment status for 1982 plants, 1986 nonat-
tainment status for 1987 plants, and 1991 nonattainment status for 1992
plants.
5.5 The Size and Timing of Investments
The questions we pose in this section are (1) does regulation induce more
up-front investment by plants (versus phasing-in) as a result of the (ﬁxed)
but not necessarily their true economic value. Given the highly imperfect nature of these
data, multiplying them by a proper user cost of capital series seems somewhat incongruous.
What we have done instead is derive “user cost factors” such that capital’s share of total
costs in our samples (by industry and year) equals capital’s share of total output (for the
corresponding year and two-digit industry) in Dale Jorgenson’s 35KLEM.DAT (available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/ and described in Jorgenson 1990). For
SIC 28 (chemicals), capital’s share of total output in Jorgenson’s data ranged from 15.2 per-
cent (1982) to 21.3 percent (1987) for the 5 census years used in our study. To replicate these
shares in our data for industrial organic chemicals required user cost factors ranging from
0.1495 (1972) to 0.2136 (1987). For SIC 30 (rubber and miscellaneous plastics), capital’s
share of total output in Jorgenson’s data ranged from 4.1 percent (1982) to 6.6 percent (1972).
To replicate these shares in our miscellaneous plastic products sample required user cost
factors ranging from 0.0689 (1982) to 0.0979 (1972). We note that in the initial phases of this
study we experimented with time-invariant user cost factors of 0.17 (e.g., a 10 percent interest
r a t ep l u sa7p e r c e n tdepreciation rate) and 0.10, with results that are remarkably similar to
the ones obtained using the factors computed here. We do not believe, therefore, that our
results are sensitive to our treatment of the capital data.
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lead to reduced plant sizes as plants seek to avoid regulatory scrutiny?
Regarding the latter, plants could also downsize to reduce investment risk
at any one location, in the face of uncertainty over local regulatory costs.
In Becker and Henderson (1997), we explore general downsizing issues in
these industries. In the miscellaneous plastics industry, we ﬁnd that plants
of the same age are of roughly comparable size across the generations. In
the industrial organic chemicals industry, on the other hand, plants built
prior to 1968 (i.e., before the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act) are
found to be distinctly larger, at every age, than plants built after this point
(i.e., those who made their ﬁrst census appearance in 1972 or later). The
size proﬁles of successive birth cohorts in the regulatory period, however,
did not continue to decline. This suggests, of course, that technological
rather than regulatory changes may have led to this “one-time” change in
average plant size. But the issue of determining overall trends in plant sizes
in this industry is complicated by the fact that there is a great deal of
switching of plants into and out of the industry (in comparison with other
industries). We ﬁnd that, after 1972, the number of plants switching out of
the industry and the average size of such plants rises quite dramatically,
while the sizes of those switching into the industry actually diminishes
somewhat. It is diﬃcult, therefore, to come to any ﬁrm conclusions.
Here, rather than try to assess the general eﬀects of regulation on plant
size, we focus on the diﬀerences between attainment and nonattainment
counties. Our main interest is in the eﬀects that nonattainment status has
had on plants’ accumulation of real capital stock (machinery and equip-
ment assets in particular), but we also consider possible impacts it may
have had on real capital-to-labor use. We hypothesize that these two items
are functions of county characteristics—wages (a cost factor), employ-
ment (a scale/demand factor), ﬁxed eﬀects, and ozone nonattainment sta-
tus—and plant characteristics. In particular, we allow our dependent vari-
ables to be functions of plant age (which will allow us to gauge investment
patterns over time) as well as age interacted with nonattainment status
(which allows us to measure the diﬀerential impact of regulation). Results
from these regressions are in table 5.1.
We clearly see that capital assets rise with plant age. In the industrial
organic chemicals industry, relative to the base group (new plants in attain-
ment counties), plants 5–9 years of age are 67 percent larger, those 10
years are 97 percent larger, and those built prior to 1968 are 176 percent
(0.968  0.793  1.761) larger. In miscellaneous plastics, these percent-
ages are 45 percent, 81 percent, and 122 percent, respectively. The ﬁnal
percentage in each of these trios reinforces the notion (discussed pre-
viously) that plants built before 1968 (and the 1970 amendments to the
Clean Air Act) are simply larger than those constructed later.
What eﬀect does regulation have on these patterns? In industrial organic
168 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Hendersonchemicals, new plants in nonattainment counties are 79 percent larger than
new plants in attainment counties. Plants 10 years of age, however, are
actually 13 percent smaller in nonattainment counties than similar plants
in attainment counties.7 These results support our hypotheses: Regulation
induces greater up-front investment in nonattainment counties, but tem-
pers the size of mature plants.
The story is diﬀerent, however, for plants in nonattainment areas built
prior to 1968. In industrial organic chemicals, these plants are actually 11
percent larger than similarly old plants in attainment counties.8 This sug-
gests an intriguing possibility. These old plants in nonattainment areas
have various competitive advantages over new entrants—aspects of their
operations are grandfathered; they are experienced players in the local reg-
ulatory process, learning long ago how to work with regulators and how
to coexist with their neighbors; and so forth. These plants, therefore, may
7. [(1  0.968  0.794  1.046)  (1  0.968)]  (1  0.968)  0.1280, or roughly
13 percent.
8. [(1  0.968  0.793  0.794  1.046  0.555)  (1  0.968  0.793)]  (1  0.968 
0.793)  0.1097, or 11 percent.
Table 5.1 Capital Stocks under Regulation
Industrial Organic Miscellaneous Plastic
Chemicals Products
ln (K) K/L ln (K) K/L
Age 5–9 years 0.668** 49.05 0.455** 7.124
(0.188) (35.63) (0.057) (7.366)
Age 10 years 0.968** 103.23** 0.809** 7.740
(0.229) (43.36) (0.071) (9.207)
Plant built before 1968 0.793** 8.57 0.406** 7.643
(0.202) (38.30) (0.069) (8.891)
Nonattainment 0.794** 82.05 0.062 4.665
(0.267) (50.52) (0.088) (11.355)
 Age 5–9 years 0.587* 36.07 0.089 0.182
(0.324) (61.40) (0.098) (12.696)
 Age 10 years 1.046** 79.10 0.086 3.055
(0.317) (60.03) (0.099) (12.781)
 Plant built before 0.555** 13.72 0.120 2.493
1968 (0.241) (45.64) (0.092) (11.852)
County wages and Yes Yes Yes Yes
employment
Year and county eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N (counties) 1,730 (220) 1,730 (220) 7,745 (820) 7,745 (820)
Adjusted R2 0.545 0.369 0.290 0
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Costs of Air Quality Regulation 169be in a better position to exploit the scale economies inherent in produc-
tion (see section 5.6), and, given grandfathering and an exodus of competi-
tors, they may have access to relatively large regional demands, compared
to similar plants in attainment areas. As such, it may be proﬁtable for them
to operate on a scale larger than that of their attainment-area counter-
parts, who face a substantial number of new entrants.
Turning to the miscellaneous plastic products industry, our hypotheses
are really not borne out. In this industry, after controlling for plants built
prior to 1968, real capital stocks are no diﬀerent between plants in attain-
ment and nonattainment areas at diﬀerent ages. Since total capital invest-
ments in this industry are so much smaller than they are in industrial or-
ganic chemicals (in any given census, the average multiunit miscellaneous
plastics plant has approximately 6–7 percent of the machinery and equip-
ment assets of the average industrial organic chemicals multiunit plant) is-
sues of phasing-in, downsizing, and so forth may be less relevant here.9
We also see no signiﬁcant eﬀects of nonattainment status on real capital-
to-labor use in these industries. In fact, very few coeﬃcients in either of
these two regressions are actually signiﬁcant. That we ﬁnd no eﬀect of
regulation on capital intensity is somewhat at odds with our later ﬁndings
with the PACE data, which show, at least for industrial organic chemicals,
capital expenditures relatively more aﬀected than labor costs.
5.6 Quantifying Regulatory Costs
In this section, we compare the average total costs of production for
plants in nonattainment counties to those in attainment counties. We as-
sume that, in any period, competitive plants face a constrained cost mini-
mization problem. We could formalize regulatory constraints in various
ways, but here we will specify a very general constraint. Suppose l, k,a n d
m are inputs of labor, capital, and materials into production; lR and kR
are inputs of labor and capital associated with regulation (i.e., pollution
reduction); w, r,a n dpm are the respective factor prices (which are exoge-
nous to the ﬁrm), and X is plant output. A plant’s constrained cost minimi-
zation problem (with respect to l, k, m, lR,a n dkR) could be written as
(1)
age age
wl l rk k pm
X Xlkm R lkml k
RR m
hR R
⋅+ + ⋅ + + ⋅
−− −
()( )
[( , , ; ) ] [ ( , , , , ; ) ] .  
9. Having said that, we note that an identical regression (not reported here) on a sample
that also includes single-unit ﬁrms (in addition to these multiunit plants) reveals some of the
hypothesized eﬀects. Namely, new plants in nonattainment areas were found to start with 20
percent more capital than their counterparts in attainment areas, but after 10 years, there
was virtually no diﬀerence between the two groups. Why these eﬀects might be found in the
single-plant sector and not the multiplant corporate sector is puzzling.
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 ) function is the regulatory constraint, where h indexes the
two possible regulatory states: attainment and nonattainment. Note that
we have allowed plant age to aﬀect both the technology of the plant as
well as (and more critically) regulatory stringency. This minimization prob-
lem, with its choice of inputs, yields a reduced-form total cost that is a
function of factor prices, output, and age. Dividing through by output and
invoking linear homogeneity of cost functions, we are left with the follow-
ing reduced-form average total cost function:
(2) age ATC p f w p r p X mh m m / ( /, /,, ) . =
We have let our needs and interests dictate our empirical formulation of
equation (2). Since we are not interested in estimating the elasticities of
substitution between factors, a translog speciﬁcation is too much. And
a simple Cobb-Douglas cost function, which is linear in output, is also
inappropriate for our purposes. We therefore choose a log-quadratic for-
mulation, which allows for a classic U-shaped average total cost function:
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D0it  1 for all plants.
D1it  1 if plant i i s5 – 9y e a r so l di ny e a rt; 0 otherwise.
D2it  1 if plant i is 10 years old in year t; 0 otherwise.
D3it  1 if plant i is in a nonattainment county in year t; 0 otherwise.
D4it  1 if plant i is in a nonattainment county and 5–9 years old in year
t; 0 otherwise.
D5it  1 if plant i is in a nonattainment county and 10 years old in year
t; 0 otherwise.
Note that the average total cost of plant i in county j at time t is a function
of output, output squared, year eﬀects (dt), county ﬁxed eﬀects (Cj), and
a contemporaneous error term (εijt) that is independently and identically
distributed. Wages (wjt), as we discussed earlier, are average manufacturing
wages in the county, exclusive of the industry being analyzed. Since we are
not interested in factor price coeﬃcients per se, we have taken some liber-
ties with respect to the other two factor prices. We assume perfect capital
markets, such that all plants in an industry in a given year face the same
price of capital. This, then, is captured by our year eﬀects (dt). Our material
prices (pm), which come from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database, vary only over time (within an industry). We can either assume
that the price of materials is the same for all plants within an industry
Costs of Air Quality Regulation 171within a year or, if we believe that there may be spatial variation in such
prices, to the extent that these price diﬀerences are constant over time,
spatial diﬀerences are captured by our county ﬁxed eﬀects (Cj). What we
are most interested in here is the shape of the cost curve and how it
changes with age and attainment status. To this end, we have included a
series of dummy variables (Dsit), which are interacted with the intercept,
output, and output squared. These terms allow the shape to diﬀer for six
categories of plants (three age categories times two states of regulation).
The results of these regressions are given in table 5.2. Note that all the
coeﬃcients on the U-shaped structure are statistically signiﬁcant, with two
exceptions in miscellaneous plastics where the coeﬃcient on nonattain-
ment  output has a t-statistic of 1.584 (signiﬁcance level of approxi-
mately 11 percent) and the coeﬃcient on nonattainment  output2 has a
t-statistic of 1.189 (signiﬁcance level of approximately 23 percent). This
poses a problem for evaluating the results for the plastics industry, which
is why we focus mostly on industrial organic chemicals in our remaining
discussion. In and of themselves, these regression coeﬃcients are not very
interesting. These point estimates, however, are necessary for the exercises
that follow.
First, for each industry, we use the estimated coeﬃcients to calculate the
level of plant output that minimizes average total cost (ATC), for each of
the six categories of plants. Every situation in each of the two industries
happens to be characterized by a U-shaped ATC function (i.e., a nega-
tive linear term and a positive quadratic term). For young plants in attain-
ment areas (the “all plants” category) in the industrial organic chemicals
industry, for example, the minimum of the average cost curve occurs at
(1.192994  [0.0622169  2]), which equals 9.587. (Recall that output and
costs are both measured in natural logs.) For industrial organic chemical
plants that are 10 years old and in nonattainment counties, minimum
average total cost is achieved at {(1.192994  1.078772  1.030363 
1.214576)  [(0.0622169  0.0588917  0.0538479  0.0632474)  2]},
which equals 11.727. Table 5.3 contains the cost-minimizing level of out-
put for all categories of plants in both industries. We will return to a dis-
cussion of these later.
Next, we take these cost-minimizing levels of output, plug them back
into the estimated cost functions, and calculate cost diﬀerentials between
comparable plants in attainment and nonattainment areas, operating at
their respective minimum ATCs. For example, the cost diﬀerentials for
young plants in the industrial organic chemicals industry is {4.751786
 [(1.192994  1.030363)  9.7162... ] [(0.0622169  0.0538479) 
(9.7162... ) 2]}  {(1.192994  9.5873... )  [0.0622169  (9.5873
... ) 2]}  0.1770, or 17.7 percent (given costs and output are in natural
logs). Table 5.4 contains the cost diﬀerentials computed for this and all







Age 5–9 years 3.594** 0.658*
(1.116) (0.338)
 ln(Output) 0.850** 0.165**
(0.231) (0.081)
 ln(Output)2 0.048** 0.010**
(0.012) (0.005)
Age 10 years 4.802** 0.931**
(0.817) (0.297)
 ln(Output) 1.079** 0.223**
(0.168) (0.069)




 ln(Output) 1.030** 0.143
(0.216) (0.090)
 ln(Output)2 0.054** 0.007
(0.012) (0.006)
 Age 5–9 years 4.908** 1.282**
(2.263) (0.604)
 ln(Output) 1.144** 0.308**
(0.462) (0.143)
 ln(Output)2 0.064** 0.018**
(0.023) (0.008)
 Age 10 years 5.625** 1.815**
(1.252) (0.487)
 ln(Output) 1.215** 0.391**
(0.258) (0.115)
 ln(Output)2 0.063** 0.021**
(0.013) (0.007)
Wages, year, and county eﬀects Yes Yes
N (counties) 1,847 (233) 8,878 (881)
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.231
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.other comparisons. Here (and throughout) diﬀerentials will be deﬁned as
the percentage by which costs in nonattainment areas exceed those in at-
tainment areas. These are, therefore, expected to be positive.
The results in table 5.4 indicate that costs are indeed higher for plants
in nonattainment areas compared to those of similar age in attainment
areas. In industrial organic chemicals, young plants in nonattainment
areas experience costs 17.7 percent higher than their counterparts in at-
tainment areas. The diﬀerence for older plants, although lower, is still quite
considerable, at roughly 10 percent. This lower cost diﬀerential for older
plants is consistent with the notion (discussed earlier) that regulatory re-
quirements are stricter for new (as opposed to existing) plants. In the mis-
cellaneous plastic products industry, production costs are also found to be
more expensive for plants in nonattainment counties, but the pattern is the
reverse. Young plants in nonattainment areas are found to have costs that
are 4.3 percent higher than their counterparts in attainment areas, while
plants 5–9 years old in nonattainment areas have 8.6 percent higher costs
and plants 10 years old have 11.2 percent higher costs. But again, the
precision and accuracy of these estimates are compromised by the two
statistically insigniﬁcant cost function coeﬃcients used in their calcula-
tion. Nonetheless, all these results point in the same direction: Nonattain-
ment status leads to higher operating costs for plants in these industries.
Table 5.4 Cost Diﬀerentials between Plants in Nonattainment Areas and
Attainment Areas Operating at Minimum ATCs
Industrial Organic Miscellaneous
Chemicals Plastic Products
Young plants (0–4 years) 17.7 4.3
Plants 5–9 years old 9.9 8.6
Plants 10 years old 10.4 11.2
Note: In percentage by which ATC in nonattainment areas exceeds that in attainment
areas.
Table 5.3 Plant Output That Minimizes ATC (natural log)
Attainment Areas Nonattainment Areas
Industrial Organic Chemicals
Young plants (0–4 years) 9.587 9.716
Plants 5–9 years old 12.459 9.600
Plants 10 years old 17.175 11.727
Miscellaneous Plastic Products
Young plants (0–4 years) 10.425 10.077
Plants 5–9 years old 13.719 9.516
Plants 10 years old 16.166 10.163
174 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon HendersonA number of issues are raised by our analysis, and we focus on the
industrial organic chemicals industry to explore them. First, one may ask
why outputs that minimize ATCs might vary by age. As table 5.3 reveals,
cost-minimizing outputs grow as plants age (although the growth is not
always monotonic). Why do young plants minimize ATC at lower levels of
output? It is probably not the case that young plants have technologies
that dictate smaller plant sizes. Arguably, some sort of learning process is
taking place. Young plants perhaps do best starting oﬀ small because they
can only handle a simple organizational structure and a smaller scale of
operation. As they gain experience, however, and learn more about their
local factor (labor and material) markets, they expand. For plants in at-
tainment areas (which show the largest growth in cost-minimizing out-
put!), there is an additional reason for starting out small. Recall that if
such plants start out too big, they may be subject to somewhat costly
BACT requirements, whereas if they start out small they face no regula-
tion. These small (initially) unregulated plants may then expand as they
learn more about their local regulatory environment and, in particular, as
they learn from other plants in the area how to best handle (or avoid)
regulation. For plants in nonattainment areas, which exhibit smaller
changes in cost-minimizing output, there are reasons (discussed pre-
viously) for not phasing in investments in this way.
Another issue, revealed in table 5.5, is that the output of the average
plant can be far smaller than the level of output that minimizes ATC.
There are a few reasons why this might be. It may be the case that regional
goods markets are imperfectly competitive, leading ﬁrms to exercise some
monopoly power (hence, production shy of cost-minimizing output). Risk
avoidance behavior (to reduce exposure) may also lead ﬁrms to invest less
than the amount necessary to minimize average total cost. Having said
that, however, we note that the diﬀerences between actual and cost-
minimizing output in attainment areas is absolutely enormous. For plants
5–9 years old in the industrial organic chemicals industry, the level of out-
put that minimizes ATC (12.46) is approximately 1.76 standard deviations
from the average ln(Output) of 9.96, and the gap for plants 10 years of
age is even larger! What is limiting the size of these plants? The obvious
suggestion is regulation, or more speciﬁcally, the threat of regulation. If
one believes these particular extrapolations out to the cost-minimizing lev-
Table 5.5 Industrial Organic Chemical Plant Output That Minimizes ATC,
Average ln(Output), and ln(Average output)
Attainment Areas Nonattainment Areas
Young plants (0–4 years) 9.59, 9.16, 10.20 9.72, 9.28, 10.61
Plants 5–9 years old 12.46, 9.96, 10.94 9.60, 9.63, 10.57
Plants 10 years old 17.18, 10.75, 11.62 11.73, 10.63, 11.77
Costs of Air Quality Regulation 175els of output, there are (virtually) decreasing average total costs through-
out. Plants in attainment areas do not generally grow to these sizes be-
cause at some point they will attract attention from regulators, they will
be sued by local interest groups, or they may even (single-handedly) pol-
lute their counties into nonattainment. There are, therefore, regulation-
related constraints even on these “unregulated” plants (that are not reﬂec-
ted in production costs). The plants that do grow to these sizes may be in
lax states, where plants in attainment areas really are left alone—that is,
areas that truly are devoid of eﬀective regulation.
The oldest category of plants in attainment areas also contains two dis-
tinct groups: those built before the regulatory era (say, the 1970 amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act) and those built after. Recall that we acknowl-
edged this distinction (i.e., pre- and post-1968 plants) in our investment
regressions. Attempts to control for this separate group of plants here in
our cost functions result in coeﬃcients insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
However, the coeﬃcients (imprecise as they are) suggest that plants built
before 1968 have much larger cost-minimizing levels of output than other
plants 10 years old. The estimates suggest that those pre-1968 plants
could operate at much lower costs in attainment areas if they operated at
a large scale—large enough to be regulated, but much less severely so than
they would be in a nonattainment area. Post-1968 plants that are 10
years old, on the other hand, operated at about the same costs in attain-
ment and nonattainment areas. (Diﬀerentials for young plants and those
5–9 years old are unaﬀected by this reformulation.) All this might suggest
that large pre-1968 plants in attainment areas, as grandfathered players
with extensive experience, reap considerable advantages. Having said that,
however, we note that it is still the case that very few of these plants operate
at even a reasonable fraction of cost-minimizing output. We are, therefore,
left with our same conclusion: Plants in attainment areas stay small to
avoid triggering regulation.
How do diﬀerences between the estimated cost-minimizing levels of out-
put and the actual levels of plant output aﬀect the cost diﬀerentials com-
puted in table 5.4? To see, we repeated the exercise using, instead, average
ln(Output) and ln(Average output). The results of these (and our previous)
computations for the industrial organic chemicals industry are contained
in table 5.6. The cost diﬀerentials for young plants are fairly insensitive to
the output measure chosen. Using average ln(Output), young plants are
found to have costs 16.7 percent higher in nonattainment areas, compared
to their counterparts in attainment areas. Using ln(Average output), this
diﬀerence was found to be 16.0 percent. Originally, using ATC-minimizing
output, we found a cost diﬀerential of 17.7 percent. For the older catego-
ries of plants, the results are less comparable across output measures. Us-
ing average ln(Output), cost diﬀerentials all but disappear for plants over
5y e a r so l d( 1.3 percent and 1.8 percent). With ln(Average output),
plants 5–9 years old are found to have costs 9.0 percent higher in nonat-
176 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Hendersontainment areas (vs. 9.9 percent, using cost-minimizing output), but the
diﬀerences virtually disappear (0.2 percent) for plants 10 years old. All
of these estimates, however, recalling our earlier discussions, are likely to
represent lower bounds on the true costs of regulation. If nothing else, they
uniformly indicate that regulation is most burdensome for new (rather
than existing) plants.
5.7 An Alternative Approach
Instead of quantifying the costs of regulation by inferring it indirectly
from a plant’s total costs (which we did in the previous section), we could
also, in principle, examine directly the environmental costs incurred by the
plant. The Census Bureau’s PACE survey, for example, asks manufactur-
ing plants about their capital expenditures and operating costs associated
with various environmental eﬀorts. This survey, however, has been criti-
cized for potentially missing a large portion of environmental expenses
(see Jaﬀe et al. 1995 for a discussion). It is generally the case that plants
do not keep special track of their expenditures on environmental protec-
tion. These data therefore must be estimated. Capital expenditures of the
end-of-line variety (e.g., scrubbers, ﬁlters, and precipitators) are rather
straightforward to estimate, since these items are easily recognized and
their sole purpose is pollution abatement. However, when capital expendi-
tures are of the production process enhancement type (e.g., the installation
of new equipment that both improves production eﬃciency and reduces
air emissions) the task is much more diﬃcult.
In these instances, survey respondents are asked to “estimate the pollu-
tion abatement portion [of such projects] as the extra cost of pollution
abatement features in structures and equipment (i.e., your actual spending
less what you would have spent without the pollution abatement features
built-in)” (U.S. Census Bureau 1994, A-12). The Census Bureau acknowl-
edges that “interviews with survey respondents indicate that estimating
such an incremental cost is diﬃcult in many instances,” if not impossible
(1994, 4). In 1992, the following “special instructions” were added to the
survey form to help respondents in particularly diﬃcult cases:
Table 5.6 Cost Diﬀerentials between Industrial Organic Chemical Plants in
Nonattainment Areas and Attainment Areas
Minimum Average ln(Average
ATC ln(Output) output)
Young plants (0–4 years) 17.7 16.7 16.0
Plants 5–9 years old 9.9 1.3 9.0
Plants 10 years old 10.4 1.8 0.2
Note: In percentage by which ATC in nonattainment areas exceeds that in attainment areas.
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environmental protection. If the primary purpose of the project is envi-
ronmental protection, report the whole production process enhance-
m e n tp r o j e c te x p e n d i t u r e ....Caution: A project with the primary pur-
pose of improving production eﬃciency may include pollution
abatement features added to meet legal requirements. Since the primary
purpose of such a project is still not environmental protection, do not
report any of the production process enhancement. (1994, A-12)
Given these guidelines, and the last two sentences in particular, it is not
clear whether any of the costs of production equipment meeting strict
LAER standards, for example, will be attributed to environmental protec-
tion and reported in PACE, especially in the absence of an obvious
baseline.
Concerns also apply to operating expenses. The salaries and wages of a
plant’s environmental staﬀ are rather easily accounted for, but what of a
production team that spends a small but nonzero amount of time on vari-
ous environmental tasks or of plant management who must also spend a
fraction of its time and eﬀort on environmental issues? Are these costs
captured in PACE? Similarly, the cost of “materials, parts, and compo-
nents that were used as operating supplies for pollution abatement, or used
in repair or maintenance of pollution abatement capital assets” (U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau 1994, A-10) might be easy to estimate, but what about the
“incremental costs for consumption of environmentally preferable materi-
als and fuels” or the “fuel and power costs for operating pollution abate-
ment equipment” (A-9)? Surely these are not easy items to calculate, even
for the most talented and organized (and patient) of plant staﬀs. Apart
from the potential underreporting of capital expenditure and operating
costs, there are certainly other potential costs that PACE makes no at-
tempt to capture. For example, adverse impacts on plant output, either
from the outright stoppage of production (e.g., to install pollution control
devices) or through the loss of operational ﬂexibility (to comply with cer-
tain regulatory requirements). All these factors argue for the approach we
used in section 5.6, where environmental costs (and related eﬀects) are
subsumed by total plant costs (and output).
Nevertheless, we conducted some rudimentary analysis of our two in-
dustries using plant-level data from the 1992 PACE survey linked to 1992
Census of Manufactures (CM) data from the LRD. Only a relatively small
sample of manufacturing plants are actually asked to complete the PACE
survey in any given year (e.g., approximately 17,000 in 1992), focusing
disproportionately on large (and hence older) plants and plants in pollut-
ing industries. After eliminating plants with imputed data (in either the
PACE, the CM, or both), as well as other suspicious cases, we are left with
approximately 15 percent of all plants in the industrial organic chemicals
industry in 1992 and about 4.5 percent of all plants in the miscellaneous
178 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Hendersonplastic products industry. This is about one-third the industry coverage we
had in our previous cost-function exercises. And young plants, a segment
we found to be particularly aﬀected by regulation in section 5.6, are under-
represented here in our PACE-LRD samples. In industrial organic chem-
icals, only 7 percent of our sample consists of young plants (compared to
23 percent of the 1992 population in this industry), and in miscellaneous
plastics, 13 percent are young plants (compared to 35 percent in the 1992
population). In the previous section, using just multiunit plants from the
period 1972–92, young plants accounted for 15 percent and 26 percent of
our samples, respectively, compared to the 16 percent and 30 percent in
the universes from which they were drawn. These diﬀerences in sample
sizes and composition, as well as in the time period covered, should be
kept in mind when comparing the results here to the ones presented before.
In particular, an unfortunate consequence of the limited number of young
plants we have here is that we are not able to properly distinguish separate
age eﬀects in the following.
Table 5.7 contains some basic statistics for our sample of plants. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we present the share of total plant capital expenditures, labor
costs, and operating costs (in 1992) directly attributable to air pollution
abatement activity. These shares are computed by comparing PACE and
CM responses to questions on capital investments; salaries and wages; and
the costs of labor, materials, energy (electricity plus fuels), and contract
work. Note that operating costs as deﬁned here (as opposed to the deﬁni-
tion we used in the previous section) do not include the costs of capital
services (essentially because we do not have data on the stock of pollution
abatement capital equipment). Perhaps most striking here is that expendi-
tures on air pollution abatement in these industries appear to be fairly
low. Air pollution capital expenditures in industrial organic chemicals only
account for approximately 6.8 percent of total capital expenditure in our
sample of plants (6.9 percent based on published totals). In plastics, this
number is less than 2 percent. The shares of plant labor costs and op-
erating costs accounted for by air pollution concerns in industrial organic
chemicals are 1.8 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively. In miscellaneous
plastics, these shares are negligible.




Capital expendituresa 6.8 (6.9) 1.9 (1.6)
Labor costs 1.8 0.1
Operating costs 0.9 0.2
aFigures in parentheses are based on published totals.
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here than we found before, a direct comparison is not possible given the
aforementioned diﬀerence in the way operating costs are measured. We
therefore instead turn to a comparison of costs between plants in attain-
ment and nonattainment areas, using the three cost measures that we do
have here. In particular, we run simple ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gressions, where our dependent variable is a plant’s ratio of air pollution
abatement expenditures (capital investment, labor costs, or operating
costs) to total plant expenditures (in those same categories). Our explana-
tory variables include plant output, plant age, a multiunit dummy, and
county ozone nonattainment status. The nonattainment coeﬃcients from
these regressions are reported in table 5.8. Only relative capital expendi-
ture on air pollution abatement in industrial organic chemicals is signiﬁ-
cantly higher in nonattainment areas than it is in attainment areas, with a
diﬀerence of almost 4 percent. All the other nonattainment coeﬃcients are
statistically insigniﬁcant and very close to 0.
These estimates obviously suggest much lower regulatory costs than we
were ﬁnding with our cost-function approach in the previous section. This
might be evidence of the long-held belief that PACE misses a substantial
portion of environmental expenditures. The potential limitations of this
survey (noted before) would obviously understate costs much more for
plants in nonattainment areas than for those in attainment areas, nar-
rowing the estimated gap between the two groups. Our earlier caveats,
regarding possible self-selection as well as voluntary environmental expen-
ditures, also apply here—serving to narrow this gap even more. And we
note again that our results in table 5.8 do not (because we really cannot)
distinguish regulatory eﬀects by age of plant. Given our previous results,
indicating that young plants are most aﬀected by regulation, and given
Table 5.8 Nonattainment Coeﬃcients from Regressions of PACE-to-Total




Capital expenditures 0.038* 0.006
(0.021) (0.004)
Labor costs 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.000)
Operating costs 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
N 135–141 571–586
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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in cost estimates may also (to some extent) be due to diﬀerences in sample
composition. That this potentially heavily aﬀected group is underrepre-
sented in PACE obviously also has potential implications for the aggregate
statistics published from this survey. The results here are suggestive, but
much more work is needed in this area.
5.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the eﬀects that air quality regulation has had on
the size and timing of plant investment in two particular industries, and
the cost such regulation imposes on ﬁrms in these industries. In the indus-
try with high relative average capital assets, we ﬁnd that new, regulated
plants start out much larger than their unregulated counterparts, but then
do not invest as much, such that after 10 years capital stocks of regulated
plants are in fact smaller. This is consistent with our previous ﬁndings
and highlights the substantial ﬁxed costs involved in negotiating expansion
permits, the beneﬁts of preserving plants’ grandfathered status, and the
desire to keep plants small (or even downsize) in an environment where
the amount of regulatory attention is often correlated with plant size. In
terms of quantifying the costs of air quality regulation, our basic results
show that heavily regulated plants indeed face higher production costs
than their less-regulated counterparts. This is particularly true for younger
plants, which is consistent with the notion that regulation is most burden-
some for new (rather than for existing) plants. Unregulated plants, how-
ever, also appear to be aﬀected by regulation (or at least the threat of
regulation); we ﬁnd that they produce at levels far short of the levels that
minimize average total costs. This, again, demonstrates the role that plant
size plays in regulatory eﬀorts.
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Comment Aart de Zeeuw
Randy Becker and Vernon Henderson are producing a series of papers on
the eﬀects of air quality regulation. This is clearly an interesting topic and
the empirical results on the basis of good data sets are an especially impor-
tant contribution to the literature.
The ﬁrst sentence of this paper reads “An ongoing debate in the United
States concerns the costs environmental regulations impose on industry,”
and then the paper explores some of the costs associated with air quality
regulation. It might be obvious, but we must not forget that the purpose of
environmental regulation is to prevent further degradation of the natural
environment. It is important to know the eﬀects and the costs imposed on
industry, but it is equally important to know the beneﬁts of improving the
environment in order to be able to consider the trade-oﬀs between the two.
This paper focuses on one side of the story, but we need the other side as
well in order to be able to evaluate environmental policy.
On the other hand, even if one concentrates on one side of the story, the
way environmental policy is implemented can be discussed and evaluated.
This aspect is somewhat missing in this paper and will be the subject of
one of the sections in these comments.
A second general comment is that costs imposed on industry by environ-
Aart de Zeeuw is professor of environmental economics at Tilburg University, The Nether-
lands, and director of graduate studies at the CentER for Economic Research.
182 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Hendersonmental regulation are often discussed in the context of the competitiveness
of that industry in the world market. It is interesting to note that the dis-
tinction between counties that are in attainment and that are not in attain-
ment in the United States resembles the distinction between countries that
have a lax and that have a strict environmental policy, but the fundamental
diﬀerence is, of course, that countries do not operate under a supranational
government, while counties have to comply with federal regulations. What
we can learn from this will be further elaborated in another section of
these comments. A conclusion follows the discussion.
Policy Implementation
The aim of the federal government is to reduce ground-level ozone O3
by reducing volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides
(NOX), the chemical precursors to ozone, by setting standards. Becker and
Henderson describe in section 5.2 of their paper how the policy is imple-
mented. Each year, each county in the United States is designated as either
being in or out of attainment of the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards. Counties that are in nonattainment are, by law, required to bring
themselves into attainment. This leads to the following diﬀerences. In non-
attainment counties, new plants and existing ones undertaking major
expansion and/or renewal are subject to lowest achievable emission rates
(LAER), requiring the installation of the cleanest available equipment
without regard to cost. Other existing plants are required to install reason-
ably available control technology (RACT). In contrast, in attainment
counties, only new plants and only those with the potential to emit over
100 tons per year are subject to any regulation. These ﬁrms are required
to install best available control technology (BACT), which is negotiable
and sensitive to the economic impact on the ﬁrm.
This way of implementing the policy gives certain incentives to the in-
dustry involved. In fact, it does not seem diﬃcult to predict what will
happen, and this type of analysis is somewhat missing from the paper,
which immediately jumps to empirical conclusions. The authors probably
had some hypotheses in mind before starting the empirical work, but it
helps, in my view, to understand the results when the mechanisms have
been discussed ﬁrst. In nonattainment counties, the incentives of the regu-
lation are to start big in order to prevent later expansions from being sub-
ject to the LAER standard of that time, and to extend life in order to
take advantage of the RACT standard on existing plants. In attainment
counties, the incentive is to start small in order to prevent regulation ac-
cording to the BACT standard. Given the diﬀerent regulation of new
plants, it is also to be expected that plant birth shifts from nonattainment
to attainment counties. This last eﬀect will reinforce the extension of the
life of ﬁrms in nonattainment counties because these ﬁrms will face less
competition both on local markets and in their struggle with the regula-
Costs of Air Quality Regulation 183tors. The empirical conclusions of Becker and Henderson are exactly in
line with this, and in the interpretation of their results they come up, of
course, with the same arguments. They conclude that plant birth in this
industry has shifted, that the survival rate has increased in nonattainment
counties, and that plants in nonattainment counties do more up-front with
less subsequent investment.
As stated before, the paper does not discuss the beneﬁts of this regula-
tion in terms of an improved natural environment. It is clear, however, that
ground-level ozone is reduced in nonattainment counties, but probably
increased in attainment counties. This is ﬁne if the damage of ground-level
ozone can be characterized as of the critical-load type, which means that
concentrations below a certain level are harmless. If the increase in attain-
ment counties does not exceed the critical load, no harm is done. Other-
wise, the regulation may not have been as successful as will be concluded
from focusing only on the nonattainment counties.
Counties and Countries
Environmental regulations impose costs on industry. This statement will
be subscribed to in general, although it was challenged by Porter (1991).
His main arguments are that ﬁrms might also be triggered to reconsider
their operation and to move closer to their eﬃciency frontier, and that
ﬁrms might get a ﬁrst-mover advantage when regulations also get stricter
in the countries of their competitors. This discussion took place in the
international context where countries that start out to internalize environ-
mental externalities are confronted with countries that lag behind in envi-
ronmental regulation. Abstracting from Porter’s arguments, ﬁrms in the
latter countries have lower costs and, therefore, a competitive advantage
over ﬁrms in the regulated countries, driving these ﬁrms out of the world
market. Alternatively, ﬁrms relocate from more regulated countries to less
regulated countries. In order to counter these eﬀects, countries have an
incentive to weaken environmental regulation and lower the costs imposed
on their home industry, sometimes referred to as ecological dumping. In
the absence of a supranational government, countries have to enter the
very complex process of international environmental agreements in order
to try to get closer to the ﬁrst-best solution.
Counties in nonattainment and in attainment can be compared to coun-
tries with strict and lax environmental policies, respectively. Indeed,
through the shift in plant birth, the regulated industry will gradually relo-
cate from nonattainment to attainment counties. In this case, however, the
U.S. federal government has less to worry about because the industry stays
within its national borders. Of course, the process leads to adjustment
costs, but the federal government has no incentive for ecological dumping.
The local governments of counties in nonattainment have this incentive,
184 Randy A. Becker and J. Vernon Hendersonbut they are subject to federal law and face harsh federal sanctions if they
do not try to come into attainment.
The reason I make this comparison is to stress the point that here costs
imposed on industry by environmental regulation are a consequence of
internalizing environmental externalities and are not a concern in the con-
text of strategic motives for the government. It is important, of course, to
estimate these costs, the main aim of the paper by Becker and Henderson,
but only to be able to make a proper cost-beneﬁt analysis for setting the
proper standards. It is interesting to note that the argument put forward
by Becker and Henderson to explain why plants in attainment counties
install cleaner equipment than needed comes close to one of the arguments
in the international discussion. They argue that nonattainment counties
must have a large number of polluting plants. Because a considerable pro-
portion of these plants remains there and have to comply with the stricter
standard, new technology will be developed that becomes the standard
in this industry. Plants in attainment counties therefore install the same
equipment, driven by technological development and not by environmen-
tal regulation. This is exactly one of the arguments put forward by Jaﬀe
et al. (1995) to explain why, in their survey of empirical results, the com-
petitive advantage of laxer environmental regulation does not lead to as
much international relocation as was generally expected.
Conclusion
These comments are intended as a discussion of the paper in a certain
context, but not to criticize the paper. In fact, the paper is well written
and contains important empirical results, using new and extensive data
sets, and arguments to explain the results. It is one in a series of papers;
this one is mainly concerned with the estimation of cost diﬀerences be-
tween counties in nonattainment and counties in attainment. The ap-
proach is to estimate quadratic cost curves and to compare the minimal
costs. The result is that these costs are higher in nonattainment counties.
The paper considers two industries, industrial organic chemicals and mis-
cellaneous plastic products, and in all the analyses the results for the ﬁrst
industry are somewhat stronger than for the second one. The authors also
compare their indirect method with a direct method using the PACE sur-
vey, which leads to lower estimates of costs of regulation. The authors
argue that this might be evidence of the long-held belief that the PACE
survey misses a substantial portion of environmental expenditures.
One thing remains a bit puzzling. Becker and Henderson note that the
diﬀerence between actual and cost-minimizing output in attainment areas
is absolutely enormous. They give as a reason that plants in attainment
areas remain small in order not to attract attention from regulators. Earlier
in the paper, however, the authors argue that plants in attainment areas
Costs of Air Quality Regulation 185only start small in order to prevent regulation, which only applies to new
and big plants. It is not so clear now what the ﬁnal conclusion is regarding
the development of plants over time. By the same token, Becker and Hen-
derson seem to attribute downsizing of ﬁrms in nonattainment areas to
the fear of regulatory scrutiny, whereas here one would think that downsiz-
ing is mainly due to higher costs. Anyway, the research program is appar-
ently not ﬁnished and a full picture might appear in a next paper in this
interesting series. To conclude, Becker and Henderson can be compli-
mented on a nice contribution to an important topic.
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